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INTRODUCTION
For several years now, there has been an ongoing debate as to
whether software patents actually stifle, rather than promote,
innovation in the marketplace. A leading commentator published
an article in the Atlantic two summers ago, suggesting that patent
protection in the software industry is unnecessary given the
industry’s natural incentives for innovation.1 In response, another
commentator wrote a follow-up article arguing that the current
assault on software patents is part of a much larger effort by critics
to weaken the patent system by tightening the requirements of
patent-eligibility and patentability.2
The same anti-patent
*

Kyle O. Logan is a patent examiner at the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO). The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily represent
the views of the PTO.
1
See Richard Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in America, ATLANTIC (July
12, 2012, 10:20 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/print/2012/07/why-there-aretoo-many-patent-in-america/259725.
2
See Richard Epstein, Richard Posner Gets It Wrong, DEFINING IDEAS (July 31,
2012), http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/123926.
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sentiment expressed in the Atlantic article was echoed in a recent
article appearing in the New York Times, criticizing software
patents for being too conceptual and vague.3 By contrast, some
would argue, and rightly so, that such rhetoric is based on nothing
more than mere speculation and conjecture as innovation and
patent protection in this country have been inextricably tied
together since our nation’s founding and an overwhelming
majority of patents litigated thus far in the smartphone patent wars
have been declared valid.4
The explosion of patent litigation at the district court level in
recent years has paved the way towards the latest round of
discussions in the debate. Since the mid-2000s, roughly 21,000
patent cases have been filed.5 From 2007 to 2009, the total number
of patent cases filed per year fell just shy of 3,000.6 By 2010, that
number reached 3,301.7 The following year, it climbed 22% to
4,015.8 And last year, the final tally rose 29% to 5,189, an all-time
record high.9 During that period, cases involving software patents
accounted for less than half of all filings.10 Yet, they accounted for
about 89% of the increase in defendants haled into court over the
same period.11
Operating under the assumption that the increase in software
patent litigation was largely due to the untoward behavior of
certain nonpracticing entities (NPE), the White House
administration decided earlier this summer to crack down on one
3

See Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-tech-giants-ca
n-stifle-competition.html?pagewanted=all.
4
See David J. Kappos, Investing in America’s Future, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 485,
486–87 (2013).
5
See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY (2013), available
at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patent-litiga
tion-study.pdf.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP
IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 14 (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets
/660/657103.pdf.
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type of NPE in particular: patent monetization entities (PME).12
PMEs, also known as patent assertion entities (PAE) or more
pejoratively as patent trolls, refer to firms which acquire patents
from others for the sole purpose of asserting them for profit. In so
doing, the White House issued several executive orders and
legislative recommendations to protect patent holders from such
litigation.13
However, it was not until last month, according to a report
published by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
as mandated by section 34 of the 2011 Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act (AIA), that we learned about the actual impact of
NPEs on litigation today.14 Contrary to popular opinion, the GAO
report found that between 2007 and 2011 PMEs accounted for only
about 20% of all filings.15 Stopping short of finding a patent
litigation crisis, the GAO did nonetheless note that the patent and
litigation systems could stand to benefit from greater transparency
in handling cases.16
As to the patent system, the GAO
recommended specifically that the PTO—the government agency
responsible for issuing patents—consider boosting patent quality
by sifting through internal data on the prosecution history of
patents involved in litigation, identifying any undesirable patterns
in examination, and modifying its examination practice
accordingly.17
In sifting through the data, the avenue du jour for many
litigants has been to challenge the subject matter eligibility of a
patent in view of Bilski v. Kappos, where the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the claims in the patent application at issue were drawn to
abstract ideas ineligible for patent protection.18 Earlier this spring,
12

See Edward Wyatt, Obama Orders Regulators to Root out ‘Patent Trolls,’ N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/business/president-moves-tocurb-patent-suits.html?pagewanted=all.
13
Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues, the White House,
Office of the Press Secretary (June 4, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues.
14
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 11, at 15.
15
Id. at 17.
16
Id. at 36, 39.
17
Id. at 46.
18
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S 593 (2010).
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the legal community received the latest installment on section 101
patent-eligibility when a deeply divided en banc panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit handed down a 135-page
decision in CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd.19 The
decision included one per curiam opinion and six separate
opinions on the proper approach for determining the subject matter
eligibility of software-related inventions.20 Needless to say,
defining this standard continues to be a struggle for courts.
However, it is worth keeping in mind one observation from a
recent Federal Circuit decision on subject matter eligibility
wherein the court noted that section 112 provides powerful tools
that are more narrowly tailored than section 101 to weed out patent
claims which are too vague or conceptual.21 Indeed, much of the
concern over claiming software-related inventions in the abstract
may be assuaged by enforcing section 112(f) when possible.
At the heart of patent law lies the notion that the claim defines
the metes and bounds of an invention.22 Put another way, a patent
only covers the scope of subject matter encompassed by a claim.23
Each claim is a formal statement drawn to a specific class of
invention, reciting the features of the invention.24 Therefore, it is
incumbent upon claim drafters to fully and particularly describe
these features for purposes of providing clear notice of the claimed
invention as well as a frame of reference for determining whether
the invention satisfies other conditions of patentability.25
That said, functional claiming is one area in which questions of
definiteness commonly arise.26 Functional claiming is a common
drafting technique in which features are described by what they
19
CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S.
Ct. 734 (2013).
20
Id.
21
See Research Corp. Tech., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
22
See In re Vamco Machine & Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
23
See id.
24
See id.
25
See Leeds v. Comm’r of Patents and Trademarks, 955 F.2d 757, 759 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
26
See Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 35
U.S.C. § 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg.
7162-01, 7164 (Feb. 9, 2011).
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accomplish as opposed to what they are.27 Although using
functional language to limit the scope of a claim is often
permissible, there is a tendency for functional limitations to blur
the boundaries of a claim’s scope.28 That is because functional
limitations cover all of the structure, material, or acts for
accomplishing a function regardless of the specific means or
manner for doing so disclosed in the patent’s specification.29 As a
result of the ambiguity, a broad claim construction may raise other
issues of patentability by extending the scope of a claim beyond
the scope of disclosure.30
Nowhere are the problems associated with functional claiming
more apparent than in the computer software industry where
software programs are written in terms of basic functions,
commands, and instructions to be executed by a computer.31 In
general, each program consists of one or more algorithms.
Similarly, each algorithm consists of a finite sequence of steps for
performing a specific task.32 Along the same lines, each step may
itself require a conversion of one or more lines of source code into
executable machine code.33 Given this dynamic, software claims
thus often describe what the program does, as opposed to how it
does it.34
Using functional limitations in software method claims is
particularly troublesome, because functional limitations by
definition are inherently broad and often ambiguous. For example,
consider the following claim: a computer-implemented method for
hedging consumption risks in energy markets including the steps
27

See Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
See Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I L.L.C., 514 F.3d 1244, 1255 (Fed. Cir.
2008); In re Swineheart, 439 F.2d 210, 212–13 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
29
See Swineheart, 439 F.2d at 213.
30
See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc); In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
31
See generally Brief for the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge as
Amicus Curiae, CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No.
2011-1301); Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming,
2013 WIS. L. REV. 905 (2013).
32
See generally COMPUTER DICTIONARY ONLINE (2002), available at
http://www.computer-dictionary-online.org/index.asp?q=algorithm.
33
See Lemley, supra note 31.
34
See Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
28
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of: (1) initiating a series of transactions with consumers for a
commodity at a price that corresponds to a risk position of the
consumers; and (2) initiating a series of transactions with market
participants for the commodity at a price that corresponds to a risk
position of the market participants, wherein the risk position of the
consumers balances the risk position of the market participants.35
Is the scope of the claimed invention clearly indicated? Do the
“initiating” steps recite a function or an act? Is there more than
one way to “initiate a series of transactions?” If so, is the claim
scope commensurate with the scope of disclosure?36
To mitigate the potential harm typically associated with broad
functional claiming, patent law imposes a special rule of claim
construction upon claims reciting a limitation solely in terms of
functionality.37 Under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), these purely functional
limitations are sorted into two basic groups: those limitations
pertaining to structure or material and those limitations pertaining
to acts.38 In patent parlance, the latter are commonly referred to as
step-plus-function limitations whereas the former are referred to as
means-plus-function limitations.39 Over the years, this statutory
rule has been applied in a number of cases to claims on machines,
manufactures, and compositions of matter (collectively, product
claims).40 While some may argue that the rule should be applied to
product claims more often than it is today,41 it is beyond question
that this rule has been applied only sparingly, if ever, to process
claims despite the statute being enacted into law over 60 years ago.
Since 1952, the PTO has issued millions of patents and likely
millions of process patent claims. Surely, section 112(f) must
apply to at least some of those claims just as it applies to some
35

See U.S. Patent Application No. 08/833,892, at issue in Bilski v. Kappos (providing
the basis for this hypothetical claim).
36
See Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981) (explaining
the relationship between the description and definiteness requirements).
37
See 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012).
38
See O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1582–83 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (construing
what is now recognized as § 112(f) as applying to two types of functional limitations).
39
See id. at 1583.
40
See generally Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty. Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328,
1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
banc); Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
41
See Lemley, supra note 31.
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product claims. For whatever reason, the courts and litigants have
largely ignored this part of the statute. Assuming that section
112(f) is in fact one of the “powerful tools” to which the Federal
Circuit has alluded, it is not unreasonable to conclude that this
unused tool has some role to play in controlling broad, functional
claiming in process claims.
For the critics who have grown increasingly concerned over
“the general problems posed by the structure and administration of
our patent laws,”42 the following discussion is an attempt to
address some of those concerns by shedding light on an area of the
law with the potential to do just that but in need of further
development. For example, what is a step-plus-function limitation
within the meaning of section 112(f)? How does one identify such
a limitation? How does one distinguish a function from an act?
May one infer the intent to invoke section 112(f) from the claim
language itself? Is the analysis for step-plus-function limitations
different than that for means-plus function limitations? If so, why?
These questions are difficult to answer, which probably explains
why this part of the statute remains so undeveloped. However, in
view of the current controversy over functional claiming in the
software industry, these questions are particularly important and
worth revisiting.
In the first section, I discuss section 112(f) and its underlying
policy. In the second section, I review Federal Circuit case law on
step-plus-function limitations. In the third section, I discuss some
shortfalls with the current analysis for determining whether a
process claim is subject to section 112(f). In the fourth section, I
propose a modified approach for identifying step-plus-function
limitations. In the fifth and final section, I conclude by calling for
the Federal Circuit to revisit the matter in order to further equip the
courts and the PTO with the tools necessary to cabin functional
limitations by an improved step-plus-function analysis.

42

Posner, supra note 1.
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I. 35 U.S.C. § 112(F) AND ITS UNDERLYING POLICY
In general, a claim defines the scope of invention protected by
a patent. A well-defined invention during prosecution is necessary
for determining whether the claimed subject matter satisfies the
conditions of patentability.43 Likewise, a well-defined invention
during litigation is necessary for properly disposing of a claim of
invalidity or infringement.44 Accordingly, the law requires an
applicant seeking patent protection to particularly point out and
distinctly claim what is regarded as the invention.45
Throughout the history of our patent system, however, the
requirement of definiteness has been a moving target.46 Prior to
the Patent Act of 1952, a common law for functional claiming
began to take root in courts across the country: using functional
language to recite novel features of an invention renders a claim
invalid for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the
invention.47 This restrictive view culminated at the Supreme Court
in the case of Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker.48
There, the claims at issue were drawn to an improvement over
a system for pumping oil from low-pressure oil wells, the
improvement being a mechanical acoustical resonator designed to
receive and amplify sound waves emanating from objects within
the well.49 In a typical claim, the improvement was defined as a
“means associated with [a] pressure responsive device for tuning
43

Leeds v. Comm’r of Patents & Trademarks, 955 F.2d 757, 759 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
See id.
45
See 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012) (providing in the second paragraph of section 112
that “[t]he specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out
and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention”).
46
See Homer J. Schneider, Claims to Fame, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 143,
152 (1989).
47
See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Co., 304 U.S. 364, 368 (1938)
(invalidating the claims at issue for “fail[ing] to make a disclosure sufficiently definite”
as required by 35 U.S.C. § 33, now recognized as 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)). Section 33
required the patentee to “particularly point out and distinctly claim the part,
improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or discovery.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 33. Claims which recited functional language at the exact point of novelty were often
invalidated for failing to adequately describe the invention. See Gen. Elec. Co., 304 U.S.
at 369. Although the terminology for this ground of rejection has since changed, the
requirement of definiteness remains the same.
48
See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 2 (1946).
49
See id. at 3, 7.
44
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[an echo] receiving means to the frequency of echoes” emanating
from those objects.50
The Court held the claims invalid for using functional language
at the exact point of novelty, and thereby failing to adequately
describe the invention.51 It reasoned that an adequate description
required a “full, clear, concise, and exact” description of the
invention.52 Rather than defining the improvement in terms of its
physical structure and arrangement in the combination, the

50

Claim 1, at issue in the case, reads as follows:
In an apparatus for determining the location of an
obstruction in a well having therein a string of assembled tubing
sections interconnected with each other by coupling collars, means
communicating with said well for creating a pressure impulse in said
well echo receiving means including a pressure responsive device
exposed to said well for receiving pressure impulses from the well
and for measuring the lapse of time between the creation of the
impulse and the arrival at said receiving means of the echo from said
obstruction, and means associated with said pressure responsive
device for tuning said receiving means to the frequency of echoes
from the tubing collars of said tubing sections to clearly distinguish
the echoes from said couplings from each other.
Id. at 14 n.7 (emphasis added); U.S. Pat. No. 2,156,519 col. 11, l. 64 to col. 12, l. 5
(issued May 2, 1939) (emphasis added).
51
Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 8. Note, however, that in the wake of Halliburton, the
actual holding of the case was a topic for debate. See Edward S. Irons, Halliburton
Decision Clarified, 32 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 167, 167–68 (1950) (questioning whether the
Court prohibited the use of functional language at any element in a combination claim or
just at the point of novelty). Some believed that Halliburton not only embraced but also
expanded upon the standard of definiteness set forth in General Electric. See Leeds &
Northrup Co. v. Doble Engineering Co., 160 F. 2d 750, 751 (1st Cir. 1947) (stating that
Halliburton stands for the proposition that functional claiming is indefinite per se).
Others believed Halliburton held only that a combination claim is invalid for failing to
particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention if the claim uses functional
language at the point of novelty. See Robert S. Smith, Functional Claims and the Patent
Act of 1952, 48 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 426, 431 (1966). This competing view was later
validated in Faulkner v. Gibbs, 338 U.S. 267 (1949), where the Court distinguished its
opinion from Halliburton on the ground that the invention was in the combination as
opposed to any particular element in the combination. Nonetheless, even after the Patent
Act of 1952, some still held fast to the view that the decision in Halliburton was not
limited to the point of novelty. See Moist Cold Refrigerator Co. v. Lou Johnson Co., 217
F. 2d 39, 42 (9th Cir. 1954) (explaining Faulkner as substantially narrowing the holding
of Halliburton by permitting functional claiming in combination claims when the
invention is in the combination).
52
Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 2–3.
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improvement was defined in terms of functionality.53 In the
Court’s view, the purpose of this requirement of distinctness and
certainty in claim drafting was to prevent a patent’s scope of
protection from extending beyond the actual invention.54
The Court then addressed the danger of allowing functional
expressions in combination claims at the precise point of novelty in
fields of invention crowded nearly to the point of exhaustion:
This patent . . . illustrate[s] the hazards of carving
out an exception to the sweeping demand Congress
made in the [pre-1952 patent statute] . . . . Petitioner
was working in a field crowded almost, if not
completely, to the point of exhaustion.
[ . . . .]
Under these circumstances, the broadness,
ambiguity, and overhanging threat of [functional
claiming] become apparent . . . . In this age of
technological development, there may be many
other devices beyond our present information—or,
indeed, our imagination—which will perform [the]
function [specified in] these claims. And, unless
frightened from the course of experimentation by
broad functional claims like these, inventive genius
may evolve many more devices to accomplish the
same purpose. Yet, if [these] blanket claims be
valid, no device [], now known or hereafter
invented, whether the device be an actual equivalent
[] or not, could be used in a combination such as
this, during the life of [the] patent.55
Several years later, Congress passed the Patent Act of 1952
wherein it adopted what is now section 112(f). In so doing, purely
functional limitations at the point of novelty were no longer
indefinite. Section 112(f) provides that:
An element in a claim for a combination may be
expressed as a means or step for performing a
53
54
55

Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id.
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specified function without the recital of structure,
material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim
shall be construed to cover the corresponding
structure, material, or acts described in the
specification and equivalents thereof.56
The legislative history is silent on the subject, so the precise
rationale behind section 112(f) is unclear.
The general
understanding, however, is that this statutory provision was
adopted in response to Halliburton.57 The basic idea is that
Congress amended the statute to permit purely functional claiming
but addressed the Court’s concern about this particular claim
drafting technique by making it clear that such limitations would
not give the patentee any claim scope beyond the scope of
disclosure in the patent.58
Under the statute, an element in a product claim that is
described in terms of function without the recital of structure or
material for performing the function is a means-plus-function
limitation, and thereby subject to means-plus-function treatment.59
As a result, every claim comprising a means-plus-function
limitation is construed to cover the corresponding structure or
material in the specification and equivalents thereof.60
Similarly, an element in a process claim that is described in
terms of function without the recital of acts for performing the
function is a step-plus-function limitation within the meaning of
section 112(f), and thereby subject to step-plus-function
treatment.61
Each step-plus-function limitation is therefore
construed to cover the corresponding acts in the specification and
equivalents thereof.62 Nonetheless, in the few cases addressing the
issue, establishing what is a step-plus-function limitation according
56

35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012).
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 (1997); see also
In re Fuetterer, 319 F. 2d 259, n.11 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
58
See O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Virgil
E. Woodcock, Patent Act of 1952—Ten Years of Interpretation: Section 112, 1962
A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT 157, 158–59.
59
See Tekmar, 115 F.3d at 1582–83.
60
See id.
61
See id.
62
See id.
57
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to that standard has proven to be difficult for courts due to the
trouble in distinguishing between the terms “function” and
“acts.”63
II. CASE LAW ON STEP-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIMS
The first case at the Federal Circuit to raise the issue was
Serrano v. Telular Corp.64 There, the claim was for a method of
establishing communication between a conventional landline
phone and a cell phone via existing telephone networks upon the
occurrence of a predetermined event.65 In particular, the method
claim recited, inter alia, a step of automatically determining at
least the last digit of a telephone number dialed on the landline.66
The court held that the step was not written in step-plus-function
form, because it recited only an act as opposed to a function.67
Unfortunately, the court did not provide any explanation of the
difference between a “function” and an “act.”

63

See infra Part II.
Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
65
Id. at 1580.
66
Claim 1, at issue in the case, reads as follows:
A method of interfacing a telephone communications-type
device which is capable of providing a touch-tone/rotary dial-type
telephone signal with a radio transceiver used in a telephone
communication system wherein the transceiver is capable of radio
communication with a remote radio transmitter-receiver system that
is part of a telephone network, said method comprising:
coupling a transceiver to a telephone communications-type
device which is capable of providing touch-tone/rotary dial-type
telephone signals in order to allow for at least one-way
communication between the transceiver and the telephone
communications-type device;
said step of coupling comprising converting each dialed
number of the telephone communications-type device into digital
data;
said step of coupling further comprising automatically
determining at least the last-dialed number of the telephone number
dialed on the telephone communications-type device; and
sending each digitally-converted number formed by said
step of converting to the transceiver for subsequent transmittal.
U.S. Pat. No. 4,775,997, col. 15, ll. 26–49 (issued Oct. 4, 1988) (emphasis added).
67
Serrano, 111 F.3d at 1583.
64
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Prior to Serrano, the issue was addressed on appeal in two nonFederal Circuit cases, albeit indirectly. The first case was Ex parte
Zimmerley, decided in 1966 by the Board of Appeals at the PTO.68
There, the applicant claimed a process for recovering
molybdenum, a metal often used as an alloy with iron, from molten
slags produced during copper smelting operations.69 The process
comprised a step of “raising the pH of [a] resultant pulp to about
5.0 to precipitate dissolved molybdenum as molybdenum
trihydroxide.”70 During prosecution, the claim was rejected under
section 112(b) as indefinite for being unduly functional.71
According to the examiner, the claim did not “recite a specific way
of raising the pH.”72 On appeal, however, the Board reversed the
examiner’s decision.73 It reasoned that section 112(f) “sanctions
68

Ex parte Zimmerley, 153 U.S.P.Q. 367 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 31, 1966).
Id. at 368.
70
Claim 1, at issue in the case, reads as follows:
A process for recovering molybdenum values in usable
form from ferruginous, molybdenum-bearing slags comprising:
subjecting such a slag to a reduction smelting operation
involving heating the material and a reducing agent to a smelting
temperature, the quantity of reducing agent, the temperature, and the
time of said smelting operation being established to effect reduction
of the molybdenum preferentially to the iron and to form a residual
slag and a metallic reduction product, the latter containing most of
the molybdenum present in the original slag but little of the iron;
separating said residual slag and said reduction product,
and solidifying the latter;
leaching the solidified reduction product with a mineral
acid under reducing conditions to extract the iron in ferrous form,
whereby part of the contained molybdenum is placed and maintained
in solution in a trivalent state;
raising the pH of the resulting pulp to about 5.0 to
precipitate dissolved molybdenum as molybdenum trihydroxide,
leaving the ferrous iron values in solution;
separating the solid and liquid phases of the resulting pulp;
leaching said solid phase with a caustic solution to extract
the molybdenum content; and
separating the resulting molybdate solution from the
insoluble residue.
Zimmerley, 153 U.S.P.Q. at 368; see also U.S. Pat. No. 3,314,783, col. 7, ll. 34-63 (issued
May 6, 1963) (emphasis added).
71
Zimmerley, 153 U.S.P.Q. at 369.
72
Id.
73
Id.
69
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functionally defined steps in claims drawn to a combination of
steps.”74 As described in the specification, the step of “raising the
pH” was an industry custom which referred to the practice of
adding one of several alkalis to molten slags to bring about a
desired pH level.75 Therefore, the Board concluded that the
disputed step was not unduly functional, and thereby not
indefinite.76
The second pre-Serrano case dealing with this issue was In re
Roberts, decided in 1973 by the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA), the predecessor to the Federal Circuit.77 In that
case, the claim was for a “method of corrugating polyethylene
terephthalate film which comprises . . . reducing the coefficient of
friction of the resulting film to below about 0.40.”78 Rather than
specifying the grounds for rejection under section 112, the
examiner simply stated that reducing the coefficient of friction
“define[d] a result but fail[ed] to identify the specific act or acts
required to produce the result claimed.”79 In affirming the
examiner’s rejection, the Board stated that the claims were unduly
functional for “fail[ing] to define the steps required to obtain the
desired result.”80
However, the Board’s decision was reversed by the CCPA on
appeal.81 Turning to the statute, the CCPA noted that section
112(f) clearly sanctions functionally defined steps.82 Moreover,
even if the Board’s rejection were characterized as one of
74

Id.
Id.
76
Id.
77
Application of Roberts, 470 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (interpreting the Board’s
rejection for being “unduly functional” as a rejection for indefiniteness).
78
Claim 5, at issue in the case, reads as follows:
The method of corrugating polyethylene terephthalate film
which comprises shaping said film at a temperature in the range of
about 100° to 175° C. by pressing said film between two coacting
rotating surfaces and reducing the coefficient of friction of the
resulting film to below about 0.40 as determined by the Bell test.
Id. at 1400 (emphasis added).
79
Id. at 1402.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
75
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indefiniteness for failing to recite the acts required to execute the
result-defined step, “the absence in the claim of specific [acts]
which would bring about the desired [result] is no defect.”83
Because the specification described how to reduce the coefficient
of friction, the claim was not held indefinite for being unduly
functional.84
Although the term “step-plus-function limitation” does not
appear in the Roberts opinion, the court’s rationale, as well as the
Board’s rationale in Zimmerley, seems to suggest that the step fell
within the purview of section 112(f).85 That said, neither case
provides much of a legal standard for identifying step-plusfunction limitations.86 However, Zimmerley and Roberts do
illustrate some of the factors to be taken into consideration by later
courts attempting to draw a distinction between a “function” and
“acts.”
O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co. was the second case at the Federal
Circuit to address whether a method claim limitation was written in
step-plus-function form.87 There, the claim was for a method of
evaluating an analyte slug in a gas chromatograph comprising “the
steps of (a) passing the analyte slug through a passage heated to a
first temperature . . . and (b) passing the analyte slug through the
passage that is air cooled to a second temperature.”88

83

Id. at 1403.
Id.
85
See id. at 1402; see also Ex parte Zimmerley, 153 U.S.P.Q. 367 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 31,
1966).
86
But see Lawrence B. Goodwin, Computer Patent Trial Issues: Use and Avoidance of
§ 112, Paragraph 6, to Make Your Case, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 809, 827
(1996) (suggesting that an expression in terms of an ultimate result may establish a stepplus-function limitation).
87
O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
88
Claim 9, at issue in the case, reads as follows:
A method for removing water vapor from an analyte slug
passing between a sparge vessel, trap and gas chromatograph,
comprising the steps of:
(a) passing the analyte slug through a passage heated to a
first temperature higher than ambient, as the analyte slug passes from
the sparge vessel to the trap; and
(b) passing the analyte slug through the passage that is air
cooled to a second temperature below said first temperature but not
84
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The Federal Circuit held that neither step was written in stepplus-function form.89 In making that determination, the court first
addressed when section 112(f) applies to method claims.90
Although the statute refers to only combination claims, the court
stated that a “claim for a combination” encompasses not only
product claims but also process claims.91 It also stated that “steps”
refer to process claim limitations, while “acts” refer to the
implementation of those limitations.92 It, therefore, concluded that
combination process or method claims are subject to step-plusfunction treatment “only when steps plus function without acts are
present.”93
The court then reviewed the claim at issue in a manner
consistent with this statutory construction.94 Specifically, the
appellee argued that the statement of purpose in the claim
preamble implicated section 112(f).95 Apparently, the argument
was that the statement of purpose automatically converted each
“passing” step into a step-plus-function limitation.96 In rejecting
that argument, the court explained that a limitation and function
must be “individually associated” with each other in order to
establish a step-plus-function limitation.97
The court also rejected the appellee’s argument that the
disputed limitations still implicated the statute because they used
language nearly identical to the means-plus-function language of a
related product claim.98 In the court’s view, neither limitation in
below ambient, as the analyte slug passes from the trap to the gas
chromatograph.
Id. at 1579 (emphasis added).
89
Id. at 1583.
90
Id. at 1582.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 1582–83.
93
Id. at 1583.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. Claim 17 reads as follows:
An apparatus for removing water vapor from an analyte
slug passing between a sparge vessel, trap and analytical instrument,
comprising:
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the method claim recited a “function,” so the claim was not subject
to section 112(f).99 In any event, the primary question after
Serrano and O.I. Corp. still remained—how does one distinguish a
function from an act?
The Federal Circuit had an opportunity to answer this question
two years later in Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track and Court
Construction.100 Be that as it may, the court decided to pass on the
question altogether after finding that the parties had disagreed in
the prior proceedings on whether the limitation in dispute was
subject to means- or step-plus-function treatment but had
nonetheless stipulated to the applicability of section 112(f).101
Still, Judge Rader stated in a concurring opinion that a proper
disposition of the case required an inquiry into whether the
limitation of “spreading an adhesive tack coating for adhering [a]
mat to [a] foundation over [a] foundation surface” in the method
claim recited a step-plus-function limitation, a means-plus-function
limitation, or neither.102
In view of the similarities between means- and step-plusfunction limitations in terms of form, terminology, and meaning,
the concurring opinion set forth a framework for identifying stepplus-function limitations that closely tracks the one used to identify
means-plus-function limitations.103 The opinion stated that the
recital of “steps for” in a method claim creates the presumption
that a limitation was written in step-plus-function form.104 It also
stated that this presumption is overcome only if the limitation
recites an act for achieving the function expressed by the
(a) first means for passing the analyte slug through a
passage heated to a first temperature higher than ambient, as the
analyte slug passes from the sparge vessel to the trap; and
(b) second means for passing the analyte slug through the
passage that is air cooled to a second temperature below said first
temperature but not below ambient, as the analyte slug passes from
the trap to the analytical instrument.
Id. at 1579 (emphasis added).
99
Id.
100
Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Const., 172 F.3d 836 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
101
Id. at 847.
102
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
103
Id. at 848–50.
104
Id. at 849.
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limitation.105 By contrast, the absence of “steps for” in a method
claim creates the presumption that a limitation was not written in
step-plus-function form.106
Similarly, this presumption is
overcome only if the limitation recites a function without any acts
for achieving that function.107
Turning to the elusive question of how to distinguish a function
from acts, the concurring opinion openly acknowledged that
method claim limitations are generally susceptible to either
interpretation.108 In such situations, the claim and specification
may provide some context when drawing that distinction.109
Nonetheless, in the context of the statute, a “function” refers to
“what [a limitation] ultimately accomplishes in relation to what the
other [limitations] and the claim as a whole accomplish,” whereas
“acts” refer to “how the function is accomplished.”110 Note, for
later discussion, that elsewhere in the opinion “acts” are also
referred to as steps.111
Relying upon this framework, Judge Rader turned his attention
to the claim.112 Specifically, the claim recited a method for
building a running track over a foundation such as asphalt or
concrete, the method including a step of “spreading an adhesive
tack coating for adhering [a] mat to the foundation.”113 Because
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 849.
Id. at 850.
Id.
Id. at 849.
Id. at 850.
Claim 1, at issue in the case, reads as follows:
A method for constructing an activity mat over a
foundation comprising the steps of:
spreading an adhesive tack coating for adhering the mat to
the foundation over the foundation surface;
spreading a first uniform layer of particulate rubber over
the tack coating;
then, in sequence, first applying a liquid latex binder to the
previously spread rubber layer in sufficient quantity to coat
substantially all rubber particles of said layer then air drying said
applied mixture until substantially no liquid is visible, then spreading
a succeeding uniform layer of particulate rubber over the preceding
layers; and
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the claim did not recite “steps for,” the limitation was presumed to
recite an act.114 Given that presumption, the analysis turned to
whether the limitation nevertheless recited a function to the
exclusion of any acts.115 Without considering the overall context
of the claim and specification, the analysis found that the limitation
expressly stated the function: adhering the mat to the foundation.116
The limitation also expressly stated the act for achieving that
function: spreading the adhesive tack coating.117 In other words,
the function of adhering the mat to the foundation was
accomplished by the act of spreading the adhesive tack coating.118
Because the limitation expressed both the function and the act, the
claim should not have been construed according to the
requirements of section 112(f).119
Judge Rader’s opinion, although only a concurrence, marked a
significant development in the body of case law on step-plusfunction claims, representing the first time anyone had ever
attempted to construe a “function” within the meaning of section
112(f) for a method claim. Nonetheless, the question moving
forward was just how receptive the rest of the bench would be to
this proposed analysis.
Later that year, the patent community had an opportunity in
Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Great Plains Chemical Co. to see whether
the Federal Circuit would in fact adopt Judge Rader’s Seal-Flex
concurrence.120 However, the court left the answer to this question

continuing the aforesaid sequential application of latex
binder, air drying the binder followed by the spreading of a uniform
layer of rubber over the preceding layers until the approximate
desired thickness for the mat is achieved.
Id. at 839.
114
Id. at 850.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 850–51.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 851.
120
Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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for another day after noting that the claims at issue would have
been infringed no matter the claim construction.121
In Generation II Orthotics Inc. v. Medical Technology Inc., the
Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment in regards to
the applicability of section 112(f), because the limitations in
dispute were not written in step-plus-function form.122 A typical
claim recited a method for bracing a knee comprising “locating a
brace about the knee.”123 The brace was defined in the claim as
having a pivotable joint between a pair of arms and an additional
“joint in the brace to allow controlled medial and lateral inclination
of each arm relative to [the] pivotable joint.”124
In the prior proceedings, the district court applied section
112(f) based solely on the fact that the term “to allow controlled
medial and lateral inclination of each arm relative to the pivotable
joint” ran parallel to the means-plus-function language of a related
product claim.125 In rejecting the lower court’s rationale that
121

Id. at 1259 (declining to address whether disputed limitations were in step-plusfunction form after concluding that the claims would have been infringed in either
scenario).
122
Generation II Orthotics Inc. v. Med. Tech. Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
123
Id. at 1361.
124
Claim 16 of U.S. Pat. No. 5,302,169 (patent ’169) (issued April 12, 1994), at issue
in the case, reads as follows:
A method of bracing a knee of a patient following high
tibial osteotomy comprising:
locating a brace about the knee, said brace having a pair of
arms to contact the leg of the patient and a pivotable joint between
said arms to allow pivoting of the knee while supporting the knee, a
joint in the brace to allow controlled
medial and lateral inclination of each arm relative to a
pivotable joint; and
adjusting the inclination to provide the required bracing at
the required inclination.
Id. (emphasis added).
125
Claim 1 of patent ’169, at issue in the case, reads as follows:
In an orthopaedic brace comprising: a pair of arms to be
secured to a wearer’s body, a pivotable joint between said arms to
allow pivoting of the knee while supporting the knee, the
improvement comprising:
joint means in the brace for allowing controlled medial and
lateral inclination of each rigid arm relative to the pivotable joint.
Id. (emphasis added).
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similar claims should be subject to similar treatment,126 the Federal
Circuit explained that such parallel reasoning has never been a
sufficient reason to invoke application of the statute.127 That is,
claims are construed independently of each other.128
In so doing, the court noted that the lack of the term “steps for”
created a presumption against applying the statute.129 It then found
that the “limitation[] contain[ed] no language that would overcome
the presumption.”130 Thus, the limitation was not construed as a
step-plus-function limitation.131
Generation II illustrates the initial stage of the court’s adoption
of the Seal-Flex concurrence. The court’s rationale clearly tracks
the same reasoning, embracing the principle regarding the effects
of a presumption on the analysis. However, the court never stated
how to rebut the presumption.
In Epcon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., the
Federal Circuit took a farther step towards the Seal-Flex
concurrence by citing that opinion as a basis in part for its
decision.132 There, the claim recited a method for introducing
pressurized gas into a resin injection molding process.133 The
claim further recited a limitation of selectively increasing,
decreasing, or maintaining the gas pressure within a mold
cavity.134
126

Id. at 1368.
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
133
Id. at 1025–26.
134
Claim 2 of U.S. Pat. No. 5,118,455 (patent ’455) (issued June 2, 1992), at issue in
the case, reads as follows:
A method of providing gas assistance to a resin injection
molding process of the type in which hot resin is injected into a mold,
gas is injected into the mold to displace a portion of the resin in the
mold, the resin cools, the gas is vented and the mold is opened to
remove the molded part, a supply of stored as [sic, gas] is provided,
the gas is injected into the mold to displace the resin in the mold
cavity at a pressure that is at all times during the gas injection cycle
substantially below the pressure of the stored gas supply, the
improvement wherein, following the initial injection of the gas into
127
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Because the language of the limitation essentially mirrored the
means-plus-function language of an apparatus claim in the same
patent,135 the district court determined that the limitation was in
step-plus-function form.136 The Federal Circuit, however, rejected
that “parallel” line of reasoning, stating that the applicability of
section 112(f) is determined on a claim-by-claim basis.137 Citing
the Seal-Flex concurrence, it then stated that the lack of the term
“steps for” anywhere in the claim created a presumption against
applying the statute.138 In the court’s view, the limitation was
restricted to the recital of acts.139 Accordingly, the court held that
the limitation was not written in step-plus-function form.140
In addition to moving the case law closer towards the Seal-Flex
concurrence, Epcon Gas is of import because it reiterates the
principle first laid down in O.I. Corp. that claims are evaluated
independently.141 At that point in time, a frequent point of
contention among parties was whether a process claim should be
the mold and prior to the venting of the gas from the mold, the gas
pressure within the mold is selectively increased, decreased, or held
substantially constant depending upon the particular requirements of
the molding process.
Id. (emphasis added).
135
Claim 16 of patent ’455, at issue in the case, reads as follows:
An apparatus for providing gas assistance to a resin
injection molding process of the type in which hot resin is injected
into a mold cavity, gas is injected into the mold to displace a portion
of the resin in the mold, the resin cools, the gas is vented and the
mold is opened to remove the molded part, the improvement wherein
a supply of stored gas is provided and the apparatus includes control
means which are operative to inject gas into the mold to fill out the
mold cavity at a pressure that is at all times during the gas injection
cycle substantially below the pressure of the stored gas supply and
which are further operative, following the initial injection of gas into
the mold and prior to the venting of the gas from the mold, to
selectively increase the gas pressure within the mold, decrease the
gas pressure within the mold, or maintain the gas pressure within the
mold at a particular value.
Id. at 1026 (emphasis added).
136
Id. at 1028.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
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subject to section 112(f) when it used language nearly identical to
means-plus-function language in a related product claim.142 The
idea was that similar claims should be subject to similar treatment.
Nonetheless, drawing a dividing line between a function and an act
was a question that remained unanswered.
That same year, in Masco Corp. v. United States, the Federal
Circuit finally spoke definitively on the question of how to
distinguish a function from an act.143 In that case, a typical claim
recited a method for controlling a combination lock.144 The claim
also recited that the method comprised a step of transmitting a
force from a knob to a lever in order to drive the lever into a
position of contact with a cam wheel.145 In the proceedings below,
the appellee argued the claim was subject to section 112(f) as the
“transmitting” limitation was too conceptual and ambiguous to be
interpreted as anything other than a function. Siding with the

142

Id.
Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
144
Claim 1 of U.S. Pat. No. 5,778,711 (issued July 14, 1998), at issue in the case, reads
as follows:
A method of controlling a lock including a knob, a
rotatable cam wheel operably connected to the knob and defining a
surface, a locking mechanism movable between a locked position and
an unlocked position, and a movable lever operably connected to the
locking mechanism and having a protrusion adapted to engage the
cam wheel, the method comprising the steps of:
holding the lever in a position where the protrusion cannot
contact the surface of the cam wheel and in such a manner that the
lever and the knob are operably disconnected and the lever will not
move in response to rotation of the knob;
receiving an unlock signal;
forming a rigid connection between the lever and the knob
with at least one substantially rigid member, while maintaining the
lever in a position where the protrusion cannot contact the surface of
the cam wheel, in response to a receipt of the unlock signal; and
transmitting a force applied to the knob to the lever through
the rigid connection after the lever and the knob have been operably
connected to drive the lever to a position where the protrusion can
contact the surface of the cam wheel in such a manner that the lever
will be pulled by the cam wheel during rotation of the cam wheel.
Id. at 1320 (emphasis added).
145
Id.
143

930

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 24:907

appellee, the Court of Federal Claims (CFC) held that the
limitation was in step-plus-function form.146
The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the CFC’s holding.147
Guided by the rationale in the Seal-Flex concurrence, the court
first noted the absence of “steps for” in the claim.148 As a result,
there was no presumption in favor of applying section 112(f) to the
claim.149 The court then found that the presumption had not been
rebutted, because the limitation recited a function and an act.150 It
stated that the function of the limitation was “to drive the lever,”
while “transmitting a force . . . to a lever” was the act which
described how to accomplish the claimed function.151 Therefore,
the Federal Circuit held that the limitation was not written in stepplus-function form.152
Utica Enterprises, Inc. v. Federal Broach & Machine Co. was
next in the line of cases on step-plus-function claims.153 There, the
dispute involved two method claims for fastening a broach to a
clamp for machining operations.154 The first claim recited a
method comprising a step of locking the broach into a fixed
position by imposing a locking force on the broach in order to
securely hold the broach in the clamp.155 The second claim recited
146

Id. at 1326–27.
Id. at 1328.
148
Id. at 1327.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 1327–28.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 1328.
153
Utica Enters., Inc. v. Fed. Broach & Mach. Co., 109 F. App’x 403 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
154
Id. at 405.
155
Claim 1 of U.S. Pat. No. 6,256,857 (patent ’857) (issued July 10, 2001), at issue in
the case, reads as follows:
A method of retaining a broach cutting tool member in a
broach tool holder, said broach tool holder comprising:
...
said broach cutting tool member comprising . . . a
peripheral outer surface . . . said peripheral outer surface having two
planar abutment surfaces disposed along said peripheral outer surface
and extending perpendicularly to said top end surface and said
bottom end surface of said broach cutting tool member, said two
planar abutment surfaces adapted to be complementary, respectively,
to said first planar and second planar abutment surfaces, disposed on
said broach cutting tool holder . . .
147
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a method comprising a step of locking the broach and the clamp
into a fixed position by imposing a locking force on the broach.156
Although the Federal Circuit correctly concluded that neither
claim recited a step-plus-function limitation, it is not entirely clear
how the court arrived at this conclusion.157 After setting forth the
said method comprising the steps of positioning said two
planar abutment surfaces of said broach cutting tool member
contiguous said first planar and said second planar abutment surfaces,
respectively, of said broach tool holder and simultaneously locating
said bottom end surface of said broach cutting tool member on said
intermediate surface of said broach tool holder whereby when said
broach cutting tool member is positioned in said broach tool holder a
predetermined accurate work position is established for said broach
cutting tool member; and
locking said broach cutting tool member in said
predetermined accurate work position, by imposing a locking force
on said at least a portion of said third planar abutment surface of said
broach cutting tool member, said locking force having a force
component directed towards said two planar abutment surfaces of
said broach cutting tool member and a force component directed
downward from said top surface towards said intermediate surface of
said broach tool holder to securely hold said broach cutting tool
member in said broach tool holder.
Id. at 405–06 (emphasis added).
156
Claim 3 of patent ’857, at issue in the case, reads as follows:
A method of retaining a broach cutting tool member in a
broach tool holder . . . said method comprising the steps of:
...
positioning said first and second planar surfaces on said
one of said broach cutting tool member and said broach tool holder
contiguous to said respective complementary first and second planar
surfaces on said other of said broach cutting tool member and said
broach tool holder whereby when said one of said broach cutting tool
member and said broach tool holder is positioned contiguous to said
other of said broach cutting tool member and said broach tool holder
a predetermined accurate work position is established; and
locking said one of said broach cutting tool member and
said broach tool holder in said predetermined accurate work position
by imposing a locking force on said at least a portion of said third
planar surface whereby said locking force generates a force
component in a direction downward from said first top surface
towards said second lower surface and a force component towards
said first and second planar surfaces of one of said broach cutting tool
member and said broach tool holder.
Id. at 406 (emphasis in original).
157
Id. at 410.

932

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 24:907

rule on presumptions regarding section 112(f), the court stated that
a method claim limitation is in step-plus-function format only if it
recites a step plus a function without the recital of acts in support
of that function.158 Reviewing the claims, it first noted that
because neither claim used the term “step for,” the presumption
was that the limitations were not in proper form.159 In regards to
the first claim, the court found that the limitation’s function was to
securely hold the broach in the clamp.160 It also found that
“imposing a locking force on the broach” was the act for
accomplishing the function, because it described how to “securely
hold the broach in the clamp.”161 The court thus held the limitation
was not in step-plus-function form as it recited a function and an
act in support thereof.162
On closer scrutiny, however, it would seem that “imposing a
locking force on the broach” better describes how to “lock[] the
broach into a fixed position” which, in turn, describes how to
“securely hold the broach in the clamp.”163 Put another way,
“securely hold[ing] the broach in the clamp” is the function of
“locking the broach into a fixed position” which, in turn, is the
function of “imposing a locking force on the broach.”164
Accordingly, “imposing a locking force on the broach” is the act
describing how to “lock[] the broach into a fixed position,” while
“locking the broach into a fixed position” is the act describing how
to “securely hold the broach in the clamp.”165 Therefore, contrary
to the court’s analysis, the claim limitation recites a plurality of
functions and acts.166
Turning to the second claim, the court held that the limitation
of “locking the broach into a fixed position by imposing a locking
force on the broach” was not subject to section 112(f).167 In its
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

Id. at 409.
Id.
Id. at 409–10.
Id. at 410.
Id.
Id. at 405–06.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 406.
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view, the limitation “did not expressly specify the function that the
‘locking’ step [was] to perform.” The court nevertheless found
that the phrase “imposing a locking force on the broach”
constituted the act for accomplishing the unspecified function.168
Query how the court was able to determine the act without first
determining the limitation’s function.
Upon further consideration, however, there is another way to
reasonably interpret the limitation.
According to that
interpretation, the function is to “lock[] the broach and the clamp
into a fixed position” while “imposing a locking force on the
broach” is the act describing how to accomplish the function.169
Nonetheless, neither limitation is in step-plus-function form,
because each recites a function with an act. The point here is that
this case provides yet again another example in the case law of the
difficulty in distinguishing between a function and an act.
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc. is the most
recent decision on step-plus-function case law at the Federal
Circuit.170 In that case, the claim recited a heart stimulation
method comprising a step of “determining a condition of the heart
from among a plurality of conditions of the heart.”171 The court
summarily decided the issue, holding that the step was not a step-

168

Id.
Id.
170
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 381 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
171
Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 4,407,288 (filed Mar. 16, 1983) (issued Oct. 4, 1983), at
issue in the case, reads as follows:
A method of heart stimulation using an implantable heart
stimulator capable of detecting a plurality of arrhythmias and capable
of being programmed to undergo a single or multi-mode operation to
treat a detected arrhythmia, corresponding to said mode of operation
the method comprising the steps of:
(a) determining a condition of the heart from among a
plurality of conditions of the heart;
(b) selecting at least one mode of operation of the
implantable heart stimulator which operation includes a unique
sequence of events corresponding to said determined condition; and
(c) executing said at least one mode of operation of said
implantable heart stimulator thereby to treat said determined heart
condition.
Id. at 1375 (emphasis added).
169
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plus-function limitation.172 Citing O.I. Corp., it simply noted that
section 112(f) is implicated only if a function without acts is
present.173 It then found, without further explanation, that the
limitation in dispute recited only an act.
III. SHORTFALLS WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH
Assuming the Federal Circuit’s sole approach to determine
whether a process claim limitation is written in step-plus-function
form is the one set forth in the Seal-Flex concurrence, such an
approach is still problematic. First, there is a tendency under the
analysis to read process claim limitations in a way that effectively
sanctions pre-Halliburton style functional claiming. Second, there
is a tendency under the analysis to read process claim limitations in
a way that contradicts longstanding policy concerns behind section
112(f).
According to the current analysis, a limitation in a process
claim may assume three basic forms. In the first case, the
limitation recites only a function.174 In the second case, the
limitation recites only an act.175 In the third case, the limitation
recites both a function and an act.176 Although the analysis in the
Seal-Flex concurrence works for limitations that clearly recite a
function and an act for achieving that function,177 the analysis
leaves much to be desired when identifying whether a limitation
should be deemed either one or the other.178 According to Judge
Rader, “method claim elements often recite phrases susceptible to
interpretation as either a function or as an act for performing a
172

Id. at 1381.
See id.
174
See Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Const., 172 F.3d 836, 849–50 (Fed.
Cir. 1999)
175
See id.
176
See id.
177
See id. at 850 (finding the function and act expressly stated in the limitation); see
also Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that the
limitation recited the function and act).
178
Compare Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 381 F.3d 1371, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2004), with Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d 1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(construing limitations of simple expressions as acts without turning to other sources of
intrinsic evidence that call into question those claim constructions).
173
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function.”179 Given the ambiguity, it is not uncommon to interpret
a limitation as an act when in fact the limitation is a function.
For example, suppose a claim recites a computer-implemented
method for managing and tracking life insurance policies.180 The
method comprises several limitations, one of which recites
“generating a life insurance policy including a stable value
protected investment with an initial value based on a value of
underlying securities.”181
A quick assessment of the claim shows that the limitation
contains language that may be deemed either a function or an act,
but not both. The term “including a stable value protected
investment with an initial value based on a value of underlying
securities” is not a separate act, because it is just describing the
structure of the policy instead of how the policy is generated182.
Thus, the determinative term in the limitation is “generating a life
insurance policy.”183 Absent the recital of “step for,” the
presumption is that the limitation recites only an act.
179

Seal-Flex, 172 F.3d at 849.
Claim 9 of U.S. Patent No. 5,926,792 (Patent ’792) (filed Sept. 18, 1998) (issued
July 20, 1999), at issue in Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687
F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reads as follows:
A method for managing a life insurance policy on behalf of
a policy holder, the method comprising the steps of:
generating a life insurance policy including a stable value
protected investment with an initial value based on a value of
underlying securities;
calculating fee units for members of a management group
which manage the life insurance policy;
calculating surrender value protected investment credits for
the life insurance policy;
determining an investment value and a value of the
underlying securities for the current day;
calculating a policy value and a policy unit value for the
current day;
storing the policy unit value for the current day; and
one of the steps of:
removing the fee units for members of the management
group which manage the life insurance policy, and
accumulating fee units on behalf of the management group.
181
U.S. Patent No. 5,926,792 (filed Sept. 18, 1998) (issued July 20, 1999).
182
Id.
183
Id.
180
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If in fact the limitation recites only an act for achieving a
function, then the question becomes: what is that function? Recall
under the Seal-Flex concurrence the underlying function of a
limitation corresponds to what the limitation ultimately
accomplishes relative to what the other limitations and the claim as
a whole accomplish, whereas the act corresponds to how the
function is accomplished.184 It stands to reason that determining
the act or acts of a limitation presupposes determining the function
of the limitation.
That said, it is impossible to say whether the Federal Circuit
would deem this term a “function,” because the case law has yet to
explain how to show “what a limitation ultimately accomplishes”
as required for such a determination.185 However, given that
software inventions are often claimed in terms of functionality, is it
safe to presume that “generating a life insurance policy” is a
functional limitation?
Consulting the specification would inform the analysis by
adding context to a determination of the underlying function of the
limitation.186 Without looking to the specification for the meaning
and scope of functional language, there is no way to reasonably
make such a determination. As a result, the limitation in this
example is just as likely to be interpreted incorrectly as it is to be
interpreted correctly.
One could reasonably infer, in view of this hypothetical, that
there are a large number of “de facto step-plus-function claims” in
the patent system today that have evaded the claim construction
requirements of section 112(f) by masquerading as standard
process claims. Consequently, functional claiming today shares
features with the practice that was rebuked in Halliburton.187

184

Seal-Flex, 172 F.3d at 849–50.
See id. at 849 (stating that a function in the context of the statute corresponds to
what the element ultimately accomplishes relative to the accomplishments of the other
elements and claim as a whole).
186
For a discussion on the function of “generating a life insurance policy” as
contemplated by the inventor, see Patent ’792 col. 11, l. 60 to col. 12, l. 63.
187
Compare Lemley, supra note 31, with Smith, supra note 51, at 433–34 (quoting P.J.
Federico, a key member of the Bryson subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee
responsible for preparing the first draft of the Patent Act of 1952, who questioned
185

2014]

STEP-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIMS

937

After a careful review of the case law, it is not surprising to see
how the Federal Circuit has never found a step-plus-function
limitation. Unlike the clear, concrete difference between means
and structure/material in means-plus-function limitations, the
difference between a function and an act in step-plus-function
limitations can be an “eye of the beholder” type of inquiry.
Complicating the matter even further is the fact that both terms are
defined in terms which are interchangeable with each other. For
instance, an “act” is defined as the process of doing: action.188 A
“function,” on the other hand, is defined as an action for which a
person or thing “is specially fitted or used or for which a thing
exists: purpose.”189
In view of these two definitions, distinguishing a function from
an act is, on the surface, a distinction without a difference;
however, a closer inspection reveals a critical but subtle difference
between the two concepts. The difference is that all functions are
acts but not all acts are functions. Rather than asking whether a
limitation recites a function or an act, one must ask whether the act
recited in the limitation rises to the level of a function, i.e., is the
act the purpose of another act? The best way to illustrate this idea
is by example.
Recall the patent in Utica, which was directed to a process for
shaping the surface of metals using a broach.190 There were two
claims at issue, one of which recited a method for setting a broach
in a clamp comprising, inter alia, the step of locking the broach
into a fixed position by imposing a locking force on the broach in
order to securely hold the broach in the clamp.191 By definition,
one can clearly see that the limitation includes three acts: (1)
locking the broach into a fixed position, (2) imposing a locking
force on the broach, and (3) securely holding the broach in the
whether the enactment of paragraph 3 of section 112 (now section 112(f)) rendered cases
such as Halliburton obsolete or simply modified).
188
Act Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/act (last visited May 28, 2014).
189
Function Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/function (last visited May 28, 2014).
190
Utica Enters., Inc. v. Fed. Broach & Mach. Co., 109 F. App’x 403, 405 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
191
Id. at 405–06.
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clamp.192 More specifically, “locking the broach into a fixed
position” is a function, because it is the purpose of “imposing a
locking force on the broach.”193 Likewise, “securely holding the
broach in the clamp” is a function, because it is the purpose of
“locking the broach into a fixed position.”194 The limitation,
therefore, includes three acts, but only two of them are functions.
The example also illustrates another idea. This is that the
relationship between a function and an act is analogous to the
relationship between a genus and species. In general, a genus
refers to a class within a hierarchy of living things having one or
more attributes in common, whereas a species refers to a subclass
within a genus having more attributes in common. In other words,
a genus comprises all of the species within that class. Likewise, a
function within the meaning of section 112(f) comprises all of the
acts for performing that function. Note, in the example, how the
function of “locking [the] broach [into a fixed] position” is to
“securely hold [the] broach [in the clamp.]”195 However, as noted
above, “locking [the] broach [into a fixed position]” and “securely
hold[ing the] broach [in the clamp]” are by definition both acts.196
“Securely hold[ing the] broach [in the clamp]” just happens to be a
certain type of act.197
The point here is that a process claim limitation always recites
an act in the generic sense of the word,198 because a function is
merely an abstraction referring to a category of acts intended to
accomplish a specified function. Thus, in the example, “securely
hold[ing the] broach [in the clamp]” refers to a category of acts
which includes “locking [the] broach [into a fixed] position.”199
Similarly, “locking [the] broach [into a fixed] position” refers to a
category of acts which includes “imposing a locking force [on the
192

See id. at 407–11 for the court’s actual findings of fact and conclusions.
Id. at 405 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,256,857 (filed Jan. 21, 1997)).
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Cf. Smith, supra note 51, at 433 (implying that a “function” within the meaning of
the third paragraph (now sixth paragraph) of section 112 is synonymous with “act”).
199
Utica, 109 F. App’x at 405–06 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,256,857 (filed Jan. 21,
1997)).
193

2014]

STEP-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIMS

939

broach].”200 Until the Federal Circuit explores these concepts in
greater detail, lower courts will continue to struggle with
identifying step-plus-function limitations in process claims.
In addition to the difficulty in distinguishing a function from an
act, the current analysis is susceptible to claim constructions that
contradict longstanding policy concerns with respect to functional
claiming. Given that the purpose of section 112(f) was to allow
purely functional claiming limited only by the specific
implementations of that function described in the specification or
their equivalents, it seems highly unlikely that Congress intended
for patent holders to circumvent the claim construction
requirements of the statute by claiming purely functional
limitations in process claims rather than product claims. Yet, that
appears to be what is happening.
As early as O.I. Corp., the Federal Circuit stated unequivocally
that each claim must be independently reviewed when determining
the applicability of section 112(f).201 The court rejected the
appellant’s “parallelism” argument, explaining that the recitation
of a process claim limitation in language nearly identical to that
recited in a means-plus-function limitation of a related product
claim is not necessarily subject to step-plus-function treatment.202
The court ultimately held that the limitation was not written in
step-plus-function form.203 This issue arose again in Epcon Gas,
where the court reiterated the same position: a process claim is not
subject to section 112(f) simply because it recites a limitation in
terms parallel to the terms used to describe the means-plusfunction limitation of a product claim.204 In sum, the very same
language that is deemed “functional” for purposes of section 112(f)
with respect to product claims is not regarded as “functional” with
respect to process claims.

200

Id.
O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
202
Id. at 1583–84.
203
Id. at 1583.
204
Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1029 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
201
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In view of the policy concerns with respect to functional
claiming that were addressed by the Court in Halliburton,205 it is
unclear how a process claim limitation is any less threatening than
a product claim limitation having nearly identical claim language.
Consider, for example, a claimed invention which is directed to a
software product and process for managing and tracking a life
insurance policy.206
The product claim comprises several
limitations, one of which includes an “investment determining
means for determining an investment value.”207 Likewise, the
process claim comprises several limitations, one of which includes
“determining an investment value.”208
205

Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 12 (1946).
See U.S. Patent No. 5,926,792 (filed Sept. 9, 1996).
207
Claim 1 of the ’792 patent, at issue in Bancorp Services LLC v. Sun Life Assurance
Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reads as follows:
A computer system for managing a life insurance policy on
behalf of a policy holder, the computer system comprising:
generating means for generating a life insurance policy
including a stable value protected investment with an initial value
based on a value of underlying securities;
fee calculating means for calculating fee units for members
of a management group which manage the life insurance policy;
credit calculating means for calculating surrender value
protected investment credits for the life insurance policy;
investment determining means for determining an
investment value and a value of the underlying securities for the
current day;
policy calculating means for calculating a policy value and
a policy unit value for the current day;
storing means for storing the policy unit value for the
current day; and
one of:
removing means for removing the fees units for members
of the management group which manages the life insurance policy,
and
accumulating means for accumulating fee units on behalf of
the management group.
U.S. Patent No. 5,926,792 col. 15 ll. 47–48.
208
In Bancorp Services LLC, Claim 9 of the ’792 patent was at issue and reads as
follows:
A method for managing a life insurance policy on behalf of
a policy holder, the method comprising the steps of:
generating a life insurance policy including a stable value
protected investment with an initial value based on a value of
underlying securities;
206
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The product claim limitation recites a function of “determining
an investment value” without reciting any structure for achieving
that function; the limitation is therefore in means-plus-function
form.209 On the other hand, a similar determination as to the
process claim limitation is not as clear. “[D]etermining an
investment value” could refer to an act just as easily as it could
refer to a function.210 Unfortunately, there is no way to reasonably
determine whether the limitation should be deemed a function or
an act without turning to the specification for the intended meaning
and scope. Nevertheless, absent the recital of “steps for” triggering
a presumption in favor of applying section 112(f), and given that
under the current approach that absence triggers the opposite
presumption, the limitation would not likely be construed as a stepplus-function limitation.
Inconsistent outcomes such as these undoubtedly call into
question the legitimacy and reasonableness of a statutory scheme
which tolerates, through clever draftsmanship, different treatment
of product and process claims employing essentially the same
claim language.211 Consider, as a case in point, the implications of
these outcomes. On the one hand, construing claim language as a
means-plus-function limitation is tantamount to saying that the
language is purely functional. On the other hand, not construing
calculating fee units for members of a management group
which manage the life insurance policy;
calculating surrender value protected investment credits for
the life insurance policy;
determining an investment value and a value of the
underlying securities for the current day;
calculating a policy value and a policy unit value for the
current day;
storing the policy unit value for the current day; and
one of the steps of:
removing the fee units for members of the management
group which manage the life insurance policy, and
accumulating fee units on behalf of the management group.
Id. col. 16 ll. 66–68 (emphasis added).
209
Id. col. 15 ll. 47–48.
210
Id. col. 16 ll. 66–68.
211
Cf. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012) (internal citations omitted) (stating that statutes should not be interpreted “in ways
that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the draftsman’s art’ without reference to
the principles underlying the prohibition against patents for [natural laws]”).

942

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 24:907

essentially the same claim language as a step-plus-function
limitation is equivalent to saying that the language is “not” purely
functional. In effect, the law is simultaneously treating essentially
the same claim language as a purely functional limitation and a
non-purely functional limitation. In view of inconsistencies such
as this, it seems untenable to maintain the current approach.
IV. MODIFIED APPROACH
Determining whether a process claim limitation is subject to
section 112(f) should ideally be a straightforward yet structured
analysis. The analysis should be able to make the determination
quickly, allowing courts time to focus on other pressing issues.
Similarly, it should permit one and only one determination, and
that determination should be consistent with the overall context of
the claim, specification, and prosecution history of the patent.
Furthermore, it should promote the underlying policy of the statute
while applying the law so as to avoid exalting form over substance.
The Federal Circuit’s current approach falls short of these
objectives.
To address these shortfalls, the Federal Circuit should adopt the
following framework consisting of three simple steps. First, the
court determines the function of the claim limitation. The
“function” refers to what the limitation ultimately accomplishes
relative to the overall context of the claim. Importantly, the
function must be understood in the context of the specification and
prosecution history. Second, the court determines whether the
determined function is expressly stated in the limitation.
Answering this question in the negative concludes the analysis. In
other words, the limitation is not in step-plus-function form if the
function is not expressly stated therein. If, however, the limitation
expressly states the determined function, then the analysis
proceeds to the next step. Third and finally, the court determines
whether the limitation recites any acts for performing the
determined function. “Acts” refer to how the determined function
is accomplished. That is, the “function” is the “what,” and the
“act” is the “how.” If the court determines that the limitation
recites a function to the exclusion of any acts, then the limitation is
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deemed to be written in step-plus-function form and thereby
subject to the claim construction requirements of section 112(f).
That said, if the limitation is still ambiguous at that point, the court
should err on the side of caution by deeming the limitation a
function and construing the claim in accordance with section
112(f).
To illustrate how the proposed analysis works in practice,
consider the claim at issue in Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude
Medical, Inc.212 discussed earlier. There, the claim was for a
method for stimulating a heart using a pacemaker.213 The method
comprised several limitations, one of which included “determining
a condition of the heart from among a plurality of conditions of the
heart.”214 After finding a presumption against applying section
112(f) in the absence of the term “steps for,” the Federal Circuit
held that this specific limitation was not written in step-plusfunction form.215
By contrast, the same limitation would have fared very
differently under the proposed analysis. As stated, the first step in
the analysis is to determine the function of the limitation. A quick
examination reveals that the “determining” limitation recites either
a function or an act, but not both. Whether the recitation rises to
the level of a function cannot be determined without more context.
That is, whether “determining a condition of the heart” constitutes
a “function” is indeterminable absent further evidence.
Given the ambiguity, the analysis must broaden the scope of its
examination so as to ascertain what the limitation ultimately
accomplishes in the overall context of the claim. According to the
preamble, the overall objective of the method is to stimulate a heart
through the use of a pacemaker.216 To that end, the claim recites a
method comprising three limitations.217 Ignoring the limitation in
dispute for the moment, the goals of the two other limitations are
respectively to “select[] at least one mode of operation of the
212
213
214
215
216
217

381 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1375.
Id.
Id. at 1381–82.
Id. at 1375.
Id.
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implantable heart stimulator . . . corresponding to said determined
condition” and to “treat said determined heart condition.”218
Therefore, to accomplish the overall objective, the method must at
least be capable of selecting the corresponding mode of operation
and treating the determined heart condition.
Likewise,
accomplishing the goals of the two other limitations presupposes
that the method is capable of determining one of several heart
conditions. Thus, although the disputed limitation may accomplish
any number of things, it must ultimately determine a particular
condition of the heart. Accordingly, the function of the disputed
limitation is to determine a heart condition from a plurality of
conditions of the heart.
Moreover, this determination is consistent with the
specification. In fact, the specification uses “step” and “function”
interchangeably when referring to limitations of the claimed
method.219 More specifically, the specification discloses a process
for determining the occurrence of a particular cardiac state using
dedicated cardiac state evaluation circuitry.220 Additionally, the
specification further discloses that determining the occurrence of a
particular cardiac state may also be accomplished by using
conventional logic circuitry.221 In other words, “using dedicated
cardiac state evaluation circuitry” and “using conventional logic
circuitry” are both acts describing how to determine heart
conditions. Surely, the function is to determine a condition of the
heart in view of the specification’s disclosure and claim as a
whole.
Because the limitation recites the underlying function without
the recital of any acts for accomplishing the function as required
by the second and third steps of the proposed analysis, one must
conclude that the limitation is written in step-plus-function form
and thereby subject to the requirements of section 112(f).
Although this proposal is not a dramatic departure from the
current approach set forth in the Seal-Flex concurrence, the
situation does not call for a dramatic response. Rather, the
218
219
220
221

Id.
U.S. Pat. No. 4,407,288 col. 7 ll. 7–14 (filed Mar. 16, 1981).
Id. at col. 9, l. 9 to col. 10, l. 18.
Id. at col. 10, ll. 19–28.
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situation dictates a measured response. Judge Rader’s framework
for analysis provides a solid foundation upon which new case law
can build. The objective of this proposal is to strengthen the
current approach by addressing the shortfalls related thereto.222 To
that end, the proposed analysis is (1) more straightforward than the
current approach, (2) more structured than that approach, and (3)
more likely than that approach to promote the policy concerns
behind section 112(f). The reasons are described below.
First, rather than inquiring into the mind of a drafter to discern
whether he or she intended to invoke application of section 112(f)
based on the presence or absence of the term “steps for,” the
proposed analysis cuts straight to the chase—what is the function?
Although the presumptions drawn from these inquiries can be
helpful, they have had the opposite effect in practice by pushing
nearly all process claims to date outside of section 112(f).223 In
any event, the presumptions are not determinative of the ultimate
question as they merely assign the initial burden of proof to one of
parties. Regardless of the presumption, the court must still
determine whether a function without acts is present.
Moreover, the whole doctrine of presumptions regarding the
applicability of section 112(f) is based on a principle taken from
222

Of course, to accomplish this objective, the Federal Circuit will have to reinterpret
the law. In so doing, the court would have to sit en banc to overturn the “steps for”
presumption; however, the USPTO has an important role to play as well since it is
responsible for administering the statute. As an administrative agency, the USPTO may
establish rules and regulations governing its process and procedures. Accordingly, it
could establish a new regulation stating how section 112(f) will be applied to process
claims during examination moving forward. At the very least, it could adopt guidelines
to assist examiners in reviewing process claims for compliance with the statute. As a
matter of fact, the USPTO has already issued supplemental guidelines on the examination
of product claims with functional language. Providing additional guidelines on the
examination of process claims with functional language would be a natural extension of
that initiative. In addition to ensuring the development of a clear and complete record on
the subject, such measures could potentially fast-track an appeal from a decision by the
Office to the Federal Circuit as opposed to waiting for the same issue to arise in litigation
involving an existing patent.
223
See William Lee & Eugene Paige, Means Plus and Step Plus Function Claims: Do
We Only Know Them When We See Them? 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 251,
252 (1998) (suggesting that claim drafters may avoid using express language that would
invoke section 112(f) for fear of having such claims narrowly construed during
litigation).
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means-plus-function case law.224 In those cases, a product claim is
subject to means-plus-function treatment if (i) an element of the
claim uses either the term “means for” or a nonstructural term and
(ii) such term is described by a function without any structure or
material in support thereof.225 The Federal Circuit has stated that
merely using the term “means for” with functional language
creates a presumption in favor of applying section 112(f) whereas
the failure to use the term triggers the opposite presumption.226 It
explained that “the use of the term ‘means’ has come to be so
closely associated with ‘means-plus-function’ claiming that it is
fair to say that the use of the term ‘means’ (particularly as used in
the phrase ‘means for’) generally invokes” means-plus-function
treatment.227
The rationale for this principle, however, does not necessarily
extend to step-plus-function cases. “Although similar,” writes
Judge Rader, “means and step-plus-function elements are not
identical and require distinct analyses.”228 Indeed, “steps for” has
not become “so closely associated” with step-plus-function claims
as to trigger a presumption of any kind. In fact, there is no case on
point at the Federal Circuit to suggest such a proposition.
Consequently, this presumption as well as the “reverse”
presumption should not apply to process claims.229 Accordingly,
the proposed analysis which does away with this presumption is
more straightforward than the current one.
Second, the proposed analysis is naturally disposed towards
deciphering those process claims at the margins where the
limitation recites either a function or an act, but not both. Drawing
a distinction between a function and an act is difficult, because the
224

See Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(noting the correlation between the use of “means-for” or “steps for” language and the
intent to invoke what is now recognized as § 112(f)).
225
See Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
226
See Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1584.
227
Id.
228
Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Const., 172 F.3d 836, 848 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
229
See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 576 (3d ed.
2009) (questioning the significance of drawing a distinction between the recital of “steps
of” and “steps for” on the step-plus-function analysis).
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two concepts are substantially similar. As noted above, however,
there are differences. The main difference is that a function is
merely an abstraction referring to a category of acts, each of which
performs the same function. Yet, a function is itself an act. Thus,
a limitation may contain a plurality of acts at different levels of
abstractness. Nevertheless, where the limitation recites either a
function or an act, there is no way to choose one over the other by
simply looking at the claim language.
The proposed analysis deals with this problem by providing a
solid framework within which each determination must follow.
Accordingly, determining whether a process claim limitation is
purely functional turns on the overall context of the claim,
specification, and prosecution history.230 Operating within this
framework eliminates the tendency for a court to make bold
assertions which are inconsistent with the intrinsic evidence.231 As
a result, courts are more likely than not to draw one and only one
conclusion on whether a process claim limitation is subject to the
claim construction requirements of section 112(f). Thus, the
proposed analysis is more structured and straightforward than the
current analysis.
Third and finally, the proposed analysis is designed to construe
and apply the law in a manner consistent with the policy concerns
behind section 112(f). As mentioned, there is no way to
reasonably determine whether a process claim limitation is
described in terms of function only without looking to the
specification for the meaning and scope of that language.
Requiring courts to review the specification when determining the
applicability of this statutory provision would prevent these
limitations from being misinterpreted. As a result, courts would be
less likely to exempt process claims from step-plus-function
treatment in cases where the claim language is nearly identical to
230

During prosecution, however, the determination would depend only on the claim
and the specification. If an examiner determines that the limitation is in step-plusfunction form, then the claim should be amended accordingly to indicate to others how
the claim has been construed.
231
Compare Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 381 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2004), with Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (construing
limitations as the recitation of acts without any function even though the specification
discloses specific acts for performing those limitations).
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that of a corresponding means-plus-function product claim.
Accordingly, the proposed analysis is more likely than the current
one to result in outcomes where process claims employing purely
functional language are cabined by this statutory provision.
CONCLUSION
Section 112(f) has been on the books for more than sixty years.
Unfortunately, whether a process claim limitation is written in
step-plus-function form remains an unresolved issue due to the
lack of Federal Circuit case law in this area. The current
framework for analysis needs more structure in making those
determinations and less emphasis on following presumptions
applied in means-plus-function case law. Absent the necessary
framework, patent holders have been able to circumvent the
limitations of section 112(f) by claiming a process rather than a
product while using essentially the same purely functional
language.
As stated, functional claiming is particularly troublesome with
software inventions.232 Computer programmers typically write
programs to perform specific functions, so there is a natural
tendency to disclose and claim those inventions in terms of
functionality. These functional limitations are inherently broad,
subject to abuse, and therefore should be limited to the recitation of
the structure, material, or acts for achieving a claimed function.233
By failing to apply section 112(f), functional claiming
impermissibly extends patent protection beyond the disclosed
invention and beyond what was intended by the Patent Act.234
In view of the turmoil surrounding software patent litigation
today, it is important to bear in mind that section 112(f) was
232

See Lemley, supra note 31, at 906–07; Brief for the Electronic Frontier Foundation
and Public Knowledge as Amicus Curiae at 2, CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 685 F.3d
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2011-1301).
233
See, e.g., Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (reversing
the district court’s claim construction invoking application of section 112(f) after
determining that the function of driving the lever into the cam recited in the method claim
step was limited by the act of transmitting a force to the lever).
234
See, e.g., Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 10, 12 (1946);
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 381 F.3d 1371.

2014]

STEP-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIMS

949

enacted in response to Halliburton. The purpose of this statutory
provision was to reinstate the practice of functional claiming, albeit
in a particularly confined manner.235 In exchange for the privilege
of employing this claim drafting technique, the scope of claimed
subject matter is limited to the corresponding structure, material, or
acts in the specification or equivalents thereof.236
Currently, the validity of software patents is challenged on
grounds of section 101 subject matter eligibility. Section 112(f)
and appropriate claim construction, however, may provide a better
avenue to weed out and curtail patents with process claims that are
overbroad and ambiguous, given that this avenue is especially
provided for in the statute rather than an undefined, judicially
created exception to patentability. To do so, the Federal Circuit
must first improve the current analysis in this area of the law.

235
236

See In re Donaldson, 29 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1845, 1849 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012).

